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Exclusionary Rule Need Not Be Applied In
Federal Habeas Reviews of State Convictions
In Stone v. Powell,I the U.S. Supreme Court held that if a state "has
provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth-Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas-corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure
was introduced at trial." 2
Respondent Powell was convicted of second-degree murder in a California state court.' A police officer had found the murder weapon on Powell
during a search incident to his arrest for violation of a vagrancy ordinance,
and the officer's testimony was admitted at trial over Powell's objection.
Powell contended that the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague; the arrest therefore was invalid, he contended, and so was the
search incident to it. The California District Court of Appeal affirmed
Powell's conviction, 4 and the Supreme Court of California denied Powell's
habeas-corpus petition. Powell then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C.A. §2254 and added to his state court objections the contention that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to believe he was
violating the ordinance. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California denied Powell's petition.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed.6
Respondent Rice was also convicted of murder. Rice and Duane Peak
were suspects in the bombing death of a policeman. An arrest warrant was
issued for Peak, and a warrant to search for explosives and illegal weapons
believed to be in Rice's possession was obtained. In executing both warrants, police entered Rice's home after repeatedly knocking on the door.
1.

__
U.S.
, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
2. 96 S. Ct. at 3052 (footnotes omitted).
3. All facts are from the Supreme Court's opinion, id. at 3039-3042.
4. The appeal court concluded that the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
5. The District Court found that the arresting officer had probable cause. The court held
that the exclusionary rule does not bar the fruits of a search incident to an otherwise valid
arrest even if the vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Alternatively, the court
concluded that the error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
6. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974). The court held that the vagrancy ordinance
was unconstitutionally vague; that Powell's arrest was therefore illegal; that exclusion would
deter legislators from enacting unconstitutional statutes; and that the admission of the officer's testimony was not harmless error.
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Neither Peak nor Rice was there, but police found, in plain view, materials
used in the construction of explosive devices. Rice's motion to suppress the
evidence seized was denied by the trial court, and the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed.7 Contending that the evidence admitted at trial had
been discovered during an illegal search of his home, Rice filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for Nebraska. The
District Court granted the writ,8 and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.' The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari in
both cases. 0
Originally the right to file a writ of habeas corpus was granted only to
prisoners held in the custody of the United States," and the scope of the
writ was limited to consideration of whether the sentencing court had
jurisdiction over the subject.'" The writ was later extended to "all cases
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
constitution . . . of the United States," 3 thereby including state prisoners,
but the scope of the writ was not expanded beyond an inquiry into the
sentencing court's jurisdiction." The Supreme Court, through dictum in
Frank v. Mangum,'5 relaxed the jurisdictional limitation by saying that a
federal court could inquire into the merits of a case brought before it on
habeas corpus if the state court had failed to provide adequate "corrective
process;"' 6 but even adequate state corrective process did not bar the
federal-courthouse door after Brown v. Allen.'7 Finally, in Fay v. Noia,1'
the Court held that the requirement in 28 U.S.C.A. §2254, that a state
prisoner exhaust all state remedies before his application for federal habeas relief would be granted, refers only to failure to exhaust remedies still
7. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972). The court found the affidavit in
support of the warrant application sufficient and the search warrant valid.
8. Rice v. Wolff, 388 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1974). The court concluded that the affidavit
was defective under Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) and Aguilar v, Texas, 378
U.S. 108 (1964), and that the warrant was therefore invalid. Rejecting the state's contention
that the search was justified because of a valid arrest warrant for Peak and the exigent
circumstances, the court found that the police lacked probable cause to believe Peak was in
the house and that the circumstances were not sufficiently exigent to justify an immediate
warrantless search.
9. Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975).
10. 422 U.S. 1055 (1975).
11. See Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 81.
12. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193 (1830). This was true even if the imprisonment was
clearly unlawful.
13. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, c. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385. This is still the only ground on which the
federal courts will entertain a habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C.A. §2254 (1971), the
modern statute used by state prisoners wishing to file federal habeas-corpus petitions.
14. In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906).
15. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
16. Id. at 334-335.
17. 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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open to the applicant at the time of the application.
Federal habeas-corpus petitions flourished under the liberalized scope of
the writ."9 Although the Supreme Court had often entertained allegations
of illegal search and seizure in cases coming before it via federal habeascorpus proceedings, 0 it had never reached the question presented in Stone
"concerning the scope of federal habeas corpus and the role of the exclusionary rule upon collateral review of cases involving Fourth Amendment
claims."'" In Kaufman v. United States,22 which held that search-andseizure claims made by federal prisoners are cognizable under 28 U.S.C.A.
§2255,23 the Court addressed the question in dictum: "Our decisions leave
no doubt that the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging
that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admitted against them at
trial." 4
The foundation for the exclusionary rule 5 was laid in Boyd v. United
States,26 when the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "almost [ran] into each
other" 7 and thereby prevented federal authorities from forcing the production of private books and papers." Weeks v. United States29 held that a
defendant could recover property held by federal authorities if that property was obtained through an illegal search and seizure, but not until
Gouled v. United States0 was illegally seized evidence actually barred
19. In 1969, state prisoners filed 7,359 habeas corpus petitions in federal courts. "[Wiell
over ninety percent" of collateral attacks filed by state and federal prisoners produce no
result. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments, 38 CHI.
L. REV. 142, 148 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971);
Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1976). Whiteley
is the only federal habeas corpus case in which the Supreme Court has specifically granted
relief on the basis that evidence used against the defendant at trial was illegally seized and
therefore should have been excluded.
21. 96 S. Ct. at 3042.
22. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
23. This is the statutory remedy for a federal prisoner alleging that he is in custody in
violation of the U.S. Constitution.
24. 394 U.S. at 225.
25. "The debate within the Court on the exclusionary rule has always been a warm one."
United States v. Janis, __
U.S. __ , 96 S. Ct. 3021, 3029 (1976). For a list of articles
discussing alternatives to the exclusionary rule, see id. at 3030 n. 21. For a list of empirical
studies attempting to determine whether the rule does in fact have any deterrent effect, see
id. at 3030 n. 22.
26. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
27. This is a paraphrase of the Court's familiar language, id. at 630.
28. For an interesting discussion of the history of the general warrant and writs of
assistance and their influence on the development of the Fourth Amendment, see Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-485 (1965); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-365 (1959).
29. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
30. 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Gouled arose from an illegal search and seizure of private papers.
The Court reasoned that admission of private papers obtained in violation of the Fourth
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from federal courts. In Wolf v.Colorado,' the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment's protection against arbitrary intrusions was enforceable
against the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but not until Mapp v.Ohio2 was the exclusionary rule held
applicable to the states.
Although Mapp emphasized that the exclusionary rule was "constitutional in origin," other decisions, especially those since Mapp, have relied
more heavily on a need to deter unlawful police conduct" and "the imperative of judicial integrity ' 35 as justifications for the rule. 36 The Court's deemphasis of the constitutional aspects of the rule can be most clearly seen
in United States v. Calandra." The exclusionary rule "is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutionalright of
the party aggrieved,"" the Court said. "As with any remedial device, the
application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial
objectives. are thought most efficaciously served; . . .it does not follow
that the Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal that
might deter police misconduct. ' 3 The Court's reasoning in Calandra
clearly paved the way for its decision in Stone.'0
Amendment would be a violation of the Fifth-Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Id. at 306, 312.
31. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
32. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Id. at 660. Several phrases from the Mapp opinion discussing the exclusionary rule
illustrate the Court's emphasis on the constitutional origin of the rule: "the Fourth Amendment . . . really forbade [the] introduction [of illegally seized evidence]," id. at 649 (emphasis supplied); "constitutionally required," id. at 648; "constitutional privilege," id. at 656;
"the [constitutional] right to privacy," id. at 656; "a denial of the constitutional rights of
the accused," id. at 648.
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28, 29 (1968); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 n.
24 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 638, 639 (1964); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960). The deterrence value of the rule did not escape the Mapp Court either. See
367 U.S. at 648, 656.
35. 364 U.S. at 208; Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 385-386 (1968).
36. Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in Stone, observed, "The rhetoric has
varied with the rationale to the point where the rule has become a doctrinaire result in search
of validating reasons." 96 S. Ct. at 3053.
37. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
38. Id. at 348 (emphasis supplied).
39. Id. at 348-350. The Court has found that the "remedial objectives" of the exclusionary
rule were not "most efficaciously served" in several fact situations. See, e.g., United States
v. Janis, - U.S. , 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976) (illegally seized evidence not barred from a
civil proceeding); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (illegally seized evidence
may be used in a grand jury proceeding); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)
(standing to invoke the rule limited to the victim of an illegal search); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1952) (illegally seized evidence may be used to impeach a defendant's
testimony).
40. Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent in Calandra by Justice Douglas and Justice
Marshall, wrote, "I thus fear that when next we confront a case of a conviction rested on
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Stone" did not deny that federal courts have jurisdiction over an illegal
search-and-seizure claim made by a state prisoner. The Court said, "In
sum, we hold only that a federal court need not apply the exclusionary rule
on habeas review of a Fourth Amendment claim absent a showing that the
for a full and fair litigation of that
state prisoner was denied an opportunity
42
claim at trial and on direct review."
The Court rejected the Kaufman dictum, that federal habeas review
must be granted prisoners convicted in state court on the basis of illegally
seized evidence; that view was said to be "unjustified" "in light of the
nature and purpose of the. . . exclusionary rule. 4 3 Calandrawas cited for
the proposition that the purpose of the rule is to deter police conduct that
violates Fourth-Amendment rights; exclusion itself is not a personal constitutional right." The question then became whether the costs of applying
the rule outweighed the benefits of deterring illegal police activity. The
costs included: (1) "focus of the trial . . . is diverted from the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a
criminal proceeding;" (2) "evidence sought to be excluded is typically
reliable and often the most probative information bearing on guilt or innocence of the defendant;" and (3) "if applied indiscriminately . . . [the
rule] may well have the . . . effect of generating disrespect for the law and
administratration of justice." 45 The only benefit of applying the rule, according to the Court, "rest[ed] on the dubious assumption that law enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal
flaws in a search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal." 4
Judicial integrity was dismissed as playing a "limited role," especially
when a search-and-seizure claim had been litigated at trial and on direct
review.41
Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justice Marshall, found the
issue in Stone to be not a defendant's right to have illegally seized evidence
excluded at trial, but rather "the availability of a federal forum for vindicating those federally guaranteed rights." He saw the majority's holding
as "portend[ing] substantial evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction . . . ."" Apparently having misinterpreted the majority's holdillegally seized evidence, today's decision will be invoked to sustain the conclusion in that
case also, that 'it is unrealistic to assume' that application of the rule at trial would 'significantly further' the goal of deterrence. . . ." Id. at 366.
41. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger filed a
separate concurring opinion.
42. 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n. 37.
43. Id.at 3045.
44. Id.at 3048.
45. Id. at 3049-3050.
46. Id.at 3051.
47. Id. at 3047.
48. Id. at 3056 (emphasis in original).
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ing,49 the dissent reasoned that, under Mapp, admission of illegally seized
evidence is constitutional error and a state prisoner convicted on the basis
of illegally seized evidence is therefore "in custody in violation of the
Constitution" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. §2254.0
The Supreme Court missed the proverbial "golden opportunity" in
Stone to set beyond the reach of the exclusionary rule good-faith violations
of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure. Support for such a limitation on the rule came from the bench
itself in Stone. Although Justice White, dissenting, agreed with Justice
Brennan "that the writ of habeas corpus should [not] be any less available to those convicted of state crimes where they allege Fourth Amendment violations than where other constitutional issues are presented to the
federal court," Justice White added that he "would join four or more other
Justices in substantially limiting the reach of the exclusionary rule as
presently administered

. .

.

in federal and state criminal trials.'

Chief Justice Burger's concurrence, in essence a rewrite of his dissent in
Bivins v.Six Unknown Named FederalAgents," made the strongest argument for further restraints on the rule when he said that "rational alternatives" to the exclusionary rule were being inhibited by its "continued
existence."" "By way of dictum," he lamented, "and somewhat hesitantly,
the Court notes that the holding in this case leaves undisturbed the exclusionary rule as applied to criminal trials."'"
The time has come to "disturb" the rule. "[Tihe same authority that
empowered the Court to supplement the [Fourth] Amendment by the
exclusionary rule a hundred and twenty-five years after its adoption, likewise allows it to modify that rule as the 'lessons of experience' may
teach."55 Simple logic should "teach" that the application of the exclusionary rule to good-faith violations of the Fourth Amendment rests on the
untenable thesis that the police will be deterred from violating the Fourth
Amendment when they have absolutely no alternative but to act in accordance with the law. Once the ordinance is enacted, 5 once the warrant is
issued, there is nothing more an officer can do. Policemen are not in a
49. The majority never said that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a state prisoner's Fourth-Amendment claim, or that the prisoner would not be "in custody in violation
of the Constitution" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. §2254. The majority said only that
federal courts need not apply the exclusionary rule as a remedy for violation of the Fourth
Amendment when the claim has been "fully and fairly litigated" at state trial and on direct
review. 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n. 37.
50. Id. at 3059.
51. Id. at 3071-3072.

52.

403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971).

53. 96 S. Ct. at 3054.
54. Id. at 3052.
55. Id. at 3054 (Burger, C.J., concurring), quoting Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code
of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REv. 929, 952-953 (1965).
56. This argument assumes that the police officer has probable cause to arrest.
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position to make their own determinations about the constitutionality of
laws they are sworn to uphold or to make their own evaluations about
whether supporting affidavits pass Spinelli" and Aguilar- standards.
JANN JOHNSON
57.
58.

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).

